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major crimes while in the military service.6 Although this was a large
extension of the military into the civil field, it was not new. Under
the 94th Article of War, which the Uniform Code superseded, the
military had authority over civilians honorably discharged from ser-
vice when the civilian was charged with fraud committed while in
service.7 The constitutionality of this power has been in issue. Re-
cently a court stated, ..... there is no intimation of possible doubt as to
the authority of Congress to make such a grant in circumstances be-
lieved by it to be necessary. '8
The right to arrest under the Articles of War came from the general
power of arrest, which has been carried over into the Uniform Code.10
Analogous cases under the Articles of War indicate that this general
power alone should have been enough to authorize the arrest in the
instant case. 1  We therefore have the anomalous situation where a
faulty construction in the Uniform Code of a specific power to arrest
civilians has not only confounded the intent of Congress to extend
military jurisdiction, but has stripped the military of their previously
existing power of arrest over discharged personnel in cases of frauds
against the government,1 2 leaving them in a worse position than before.
The solution to this problem is difficult. The Uniform Code could
be modified to grant the power of arrest over civilians which the court
found lacking, and partially satisfy the public resentment to military
authority by requiring a hearing and arraignment before a civil magis-
trate, as prescribed under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3
But still there is the problem of removing a civilian to a distant land
Congress expressly intended that major offenders should no longer go
unpunished. H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949); Sen. Rep. No.
486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y.
1952) (An OSS officer was murdered by his subordinates behind the lines in
1944. Both suspects had received discharges and returned to civilian life
before the crime was discovered. No United States court martial or civil
court had jurisdiction, and an attempt at extradition by Italy was denied.).
712 Stat. 696 (1863), continued in amendments, Article 60 of the Articles
of War, Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1878); Art. 94 of the Articles of War, 41 Stat. 805
(1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1566 (1946).
8Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1950). Accord: In re Bogart, 3
Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1596 (Cal. 1873).
1 Article 69 of the Articles of War, 41 Stat. 802 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1541
(1946).
"1 Any person authorized under regulations governing the armed forces to
apprehend persons subject to this code or to trial thereunder may do so upon
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person
apprehended committed it." Article 7(b) Uniform Code of Military Justice,
64 Stat. 111 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. 1951).
11 Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1950); Kronberg v. White, 84 F.
Supp. 392 (S.D. Cal. 1949); United States v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp.
661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
1. See note 7 supra.
"Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.
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for a trial conducted according to military justice where the civilian
will be subjected to a court which isn't required to follow the pro-
cedural guarantees imposed on civil courts."4 Also, there is the prob-
lem of the power of the military or the accused to bring discharged
personnel back to foreign lands to act as witnesses.
Another solution to the problem would be to grant to civil courts
extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain criminal prosecutions. Crimes
such as murder and manslaughter are now considered crimes against
the United States and punishable if "within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."'1 This could be extended
extraterritorially as has been done in the case of treason.' Such an
extension of jurisdiction by the United States has been held not to be
be in conflict with international law, 7 unless a limitation has been
placed upon its power by some treaty.' s If discharged personnel were
amenable to civil courts, jurisdiction would be in accordance with
federal statutes:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas or else-
where out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, shall be
in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first
brought.19
Granting of such jurisdiction to civil courts is, of course, open to
criticism. There is the problem of bringing foreign nationals of the
country where the offense was committed to the United States to ap-
pear as witnesses, leading to the argument that an offender should be
tried at the locus of the offense. Also, it is open to question whether a
veteran committing an offense while in the service should be granted
the privileges afforded by civil courts when military personnel com-
mitting similar offenses under similar conditions are subject to the
limited procedural protections of the military courts.20
14 For a collection of allegations on which civil courts have refused habeas
corpus concerning procedural guarantees, see Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus:
II, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 699, 717-720 (1951).
1162 Stat. 756 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. 1952); 62 Stat. 756 (1950), 18
U.S.C. § 1112 (Supp. 1952). See also United States v. Demarchi, 25 Fed. Cas.
814, No. 14,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1862); United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 551, No.
16,056 (Cir. Mass. 1859).
" 35 Stat. 1088 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1952).
" "For, aside from the question of the extent of control which the United
States may exert in the interest of self-protection over waters near its borders,
although beyond its territorial limits, the United States is not debarred by any
rule of international law from governing the conduct of its citizens upon the
high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed." Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
18 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
' 62 Stat. 826 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1952). Offenses within this section
mean offenses against the United States, 20 Ops. Att'y. Gen. 24 (1893).
" See note 14 supra.

